Famine. The medieval chronicles and other literary sources (eg, the Kyivan Cave Patericon) mention famine caused mainly by crop failures or war. The 1090s, 1193 (or 1195), and 1219 were ‘hungry years.’ Of the great famine in 1230–1, a chronicler wrote ‘there was famine throughout Rus’ except Kyiv.’ Famine was not as frequent in Ukraine as on Russian or Belarusian territories because of more favorable natural conditions. As well, sometimes when famine struck one region (eg, Volhynia in 1219), the other regions had good harvests. The devastation caused by Tatar incursions (see Tatars) led to famine in some regions.

In the Hetman state there were ‘hungry years’ in Bohdan Khmelnytsky's time and during the Ruin. There was also a great famine in 1698 and after the Battle of Poltava (1709). The causes were crop failures, locusts, war, Tatar incursions, and Muscovite and Polish military expeditions. However, it was generally the population of certain regions or a part of Ukraine, not of all Ukraine, that suffered famine. The regions that experienced hunger most frequently in the 18th century were the steppes, Polisia, and the Carpathian Mountains.

In the 19th century there were a few difficult years of famine in Ukraine (1833–4, 1844–6, 1855, etc), but much fewer than in the Russian gubernias (which had 40). Crop failures and hunger led to great unrest among the peasantry in 1901–7 and stimulated emigration.

In the Russian Empire famine relief was organized by the government, zemstvos, and philanthropic societies. However, the tsarist government restricted the initiative of the societies, believing that they encouraged opposition. The government lent grain to certain categories of the population on the strength of future harvests.

In Western Ukraine, mainly in the mountain regions of Subcarpathia and Transcarpathia, malnutrition was practically chronic in the 1930s. In 1930–1 famine struck these areas. The governments of Poland and Czechoslovakia failed to provide adequate relief. In 1935, when the Ukrainian population of southern Bessarabia was stricken with famine caused by drought, the Ukrainians of Bukovyna furnished aid.

The Ukrainian SSR experienced three severe famines, during which millions perished. These occurred in the wake of reduced grain yields caused by poor harvests. But the major contributing factor in each case was food requisitions (or seizures) by Soviet authorities that left the population without enough to sustain itself over any extended period of time. The famines of 1921–3 and 1946–7 were previously regarded largely as the results of poor harvests. However, research undertaken since the late 1980s has established the centrality of Soviet requisitions in transforming the existing food shortfalls into calamitous famines. The general contours of the Ukrainian Famine-Genocide of 1932–33 were known to Ukrainians outside the USSR for many years, particularly following the arrival in the West of postwar émigrés. But this famine-genocide remains largely unknown to the general public and a matter that was barely dealt with by scholars until the 1980s. This situation was acerbated by the USSR’s categorical denial of the very existence of that famine, let alone any acknowledgement of the manner of its creation. There have been significant developments in the knowledge about and public awareness of the 1932–3 famine since the major commemoration of its 50th anniversary by Ukrainians in the West, increased research on the topic by Western scholars, and the emergence of the famine as a public and scholarly issue in post-Soviet Ukraine.

The famine of 1921–3 was set in motion by drought and crop failure. Only a quarter to a third of the regular prewar harvest was obtained in Ukraine in 1921. The southern gubernias were hardest hit, with the average yield approximately 10 percent of a normal crop (Mykolaiv gubernia 4 percent; Zaporizhia gubernia and Katerynoslav gubernia 5 percent; Donetske gubernia 12 percent; and Odesa gubernia 17 percent). The calamity was even greater in certain regions of Russia, mainly along the Volga River.

Famine may have been averted in Ukraine, given the fact that it retained food reserves from previous years. However, the Soviet government transferred massive amounts of grain from Ukraine to Russia before and during this period. In 1920 grain was requisitioned with much violence by special military expeditions (see Surplus appropriation system) and Committees of Poor Peasants for food allotments (prodrazverstki). In 1921 an unusually heavy tax in kind was exacted of Ukraine: 295,000 t (out of a total of 884,449 t) were collected from the five southern gubernias of Ukraine. As a result, in the fall of 1921 famine hit Ukraine. By 1 March 1922, in the five Ukrainian gubernias that were officially recognized as famine-stricken, 3.5 million people, or 36 percent of the population, were without food (78 percent of the population of Zaporizhia gubernia and 50 percent of Mykolaiv gubernia, but only 500,000 in the other gubernias). In May 1922 the total number of people affected almost doubled. The mortality rate increased sharply: in Katerynoslav gubernia, 67 people per 1,000 died in 1921–2; 79 per 1,000 died in the Crimea. Epidemic diseases, mainly relapsing fever, typhus, typhoid, and at times cholera, also took many lives.

The Soviet government’s famine-relief activities through 1921 were limited to the Volga region. In fact, Moscow was unwilling to recognize the situation in Ukraine. Soviet Ukrainian officials, who had been instructed that famine relief in Russia was an absolute priority, did not broach the issue of famine in their republic until late in 1921. In Ukraine most of the relief work was done by civic and co-operative organizations. The clergy, which had been deprived of civil rights, participated in this work. The Soviet government confiscated church valuables under the pretext that they were needed to help the hungry. Metropolitan Vasyl Lypkivsky issued a special appeal from the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox church for help to the famine victims. In Lviv the National Committee for Relief to Starving Ukraine was active. Similar committees were formed by émigrés in Vienna, Prague, Berlin, and North America. Foreign philanthropic institutions—the American Relief Administration, the Nansen International Office for Refugees, the Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, and the Czechoslovakian Red Cross—also furnished aid. Their activity throughout 1921 was limited to the famine in the Volga region. Only in 1922 were they afforded access to Ukraine. Under Fridtjof Nansen's instructions, Captain V.A. Quisling toured Ukraine at the beginning of 1922 and later published a report on the famine.

The famine continued beyond the summer of 1922. The harvest that year was again poor (approx 40 percent of the 1916 crop), but not as bad as during 1921. It would have sufficed for Ukraine’s own needs, but again onerous requisitions for grain to be shipped to Russia were placed on the republic. Moreover, Soviet authorities also ordered that grain from Ukraine be exported abroad in order to raise hard currency. This again led to famine conditions, although not ones as severe as in 1921. The existence of continued famine in Ukraine was hidden by Soviet authorities, who claimed that the 1922 harvest had eliminated the crisis.

Calculating the number of victims of the famine of 1921–3 is problematic, as no systematic records of mortality for this period exist and the demographic upheavals accompanying the years of war and revolution in Ukraine render an analysis of the 1926 Soviet census figures unfruitful in this regard. The scope of the tragedy is suggested by a count done by medical personnel in the Ukrainian SSR, which established that 235,000 persons died in the winter of 1921–2 in the five hardest-affected southern gubernias. The figure is certainly substantially lower than the actual number, as the survey was by no means exhaustive. Moreover, it is limited to a single period of the famine (albeit when it was at its height). As such, the scale of the mortality for the entire course of the famine is in the range of many hundreds of thousands, with a distinct possibility that it could have reached a million or more.

The question of what motivated the Soviet authorities to aggravate the scale of the famine in Ukraine deliberately has not been uncovered in archival sources. However, researchers have suggested a number of likely factors. The first—and perhaps most benign—is that the famine was a by-product of the rushed Soviet effort to establish the rudiments of a centralized planned economy. Another possibility is the fact that the authorities were keen to prevent unrest in industrial centers, where a concentration of hungry, discontented workers represented a potential threat to their power; in contrast, the scattered population of peasants in small villages represented no great concern. More likely is the suggestion that the Bolsheviks wished to consolidate their main base of support, which was in Russia, and were willing to do this at Ukraine’s expense. This dovetails with a final suggested factor: that the Soviet regime wished to quell opposition in Ukraine (see Ukrainian-Soviet War, 1917–21 and Partisan movement in Ukraine 1918–22) and was prepared to use famine as a weapon in this quest.

The Ukrainian Famine-Genocide of 1932–33 stemmed from political rather than natural causes. In 1932 Ukraine had an average grain harvest of 146,600,000 centners (or 15,500,000 centners more than in 1928), and there was no danger of famine. The famine was, first, a planned repression of the peasants by the Soviet government for their resistance to collectivization; secondly, an intentional attack on the Ukrainian village, which was the bulwark of the process of Ukrainization; and, thirdly, a result of the forced export of grain in exchange for imported machinery, which was required for the implementation of the policy of industrialization.

With increased grain requisitioning in 1930–2, the rural population was already experiencing hunger in the spring of 1932. But an unprecedented calamity came in the winter and spring of 1933 before a new harvest could be gathered. The grain collections of 1932 were carried out with brutality and with the threat of death to those who resisted. A law of 7 August 1932 introduced the death penalty ‘for violating the sanctity of socialist property,’ and 112,000 special agents were sent to Ukraine for the exaction of grain. They fulfilled their task by using terror against both collective and independent farmers. By the end of 1932 Moscow's food-collection plan, which exceeded the actual harvest, was 72 percent fulfilled. The food-collection plan for 1932–3 was based on the area of land that was to be seeded. In reality, less land was seeded, and even less produced the expected crops. The rural population was left without any means of sustenance, and the authorities did not organize any supplies for the villages. The famine-genocide affected almost all parts of Ukraine, but it grew to massive proportions in the southern and eastern oblasts. It also struck territories bordering on the Ukrainian SSR and populated mostly by Ukrainians, such as the Kuban and the Don region. Only an insignificant part of the population—the privileged rural Communists and officials who were served by a special distribution system—did not experience hunger. Towns and industrial regions suffered less, because they were provided with a rationing system. The peasants were thus hardest hit. They fed on various surrogates. Disease became rampant, and occurrences of cannibalism were reported. Whoever had the strength fled to the towns, to the Donets Basin, or to the north in search of food, although this was prohibited. The mortality rate was very high: in some regions it reached 20–25 percent of the population.

Some villages in the Poltava, Kharkiv, and Kyiv regions were completely deserted by the spring of 1933. Most of their inhabitants perished; others escaped. In the fall of 1933 these villages began to be resettled with Russian peasants, mainly from Orel oblast. Much of Ukraine, particularly the villages and small towns, looked like ghost towns. Agricultural work was hardly noticeable. During the spring sowing in 1933 the state-assigned seed had to be protected by armed guards. The field workers got minimal rations. Only the first fruits and vegetables of the summer saved those who had survived. But the effects of poor health, accelerated mortality, and a falling birthrate became apparent later.

The estimates of the number of the victims of the Ukrainian Famine-Genocide of 1932–33 vary widely. At the extremely high end the figure of ten million is sometimes cited. For many years seven million was the number commonly used in the West. The Ukrainian Helsinki Group suggested a maximum figure of six million or more. Others have given a figure of three to four million (Dmytro Solovei, Mykola Prykhodko, W.H. Chamberlin, and Vasyl I. Hryshko). Volodymyr Kubijovyč and Clarence Augustus Manning suggest two to three million. Demographic research by S. Maksudov (pseud of A. Babyonyshev) set the population loss in Ukraine during this period at 4.5 million; a subsequent study by J. Vallin, F. Meslé, S. Adamets, and S. Pyrozhkov essentially confirmed Maksudov’s figures (losses are set at 4.6 million), although further refinements have established a figure of 2.6 million deaths caused by ‘exceptional mortality.’ The fact that the 1937 Soviet census was officially declared invalid suggests that it might have shown a catastrophic drop in population.

Undoubtedly, this great tragedy for Ukraine was a planned action of the Party leadership, headed by Joseph Stalin. Its purpose was to break the backbone of the Ukrainian people by destroying ‘the kulak class,’ ie, all those who resisted the regime, including collectivized peasants. Actually, the blow was directed at the peasantry as a whole, which in Bolshevik theory was ‘the basic army of the nationalist movement.’ It should be noted that this policy was accompanied by a campaign to suppress Ukrainian culture. The manager of this campaign was Stalin's personal commissar from Moscow, Pavel Postyshev. As the second secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Ukraine, he ruled Ukraine dictatorially. According to him, ‘1933 was the year of defeat for the Ukrainian nationalist counterrevolution.’ Leading Ukrainian Communists (Hryhorii Petrovsky, Mykola Skrypnyk, Vlas Chubar) tried to persuade Moscow to change its policy and to counteract the famine, but their efforts were to no avail. They were accused in the Central Committee of ‘sabotage.’ In protest, Mykola Khvylovy and then Skrypnyk committed suicide.

The Soviet authorities were silent about the famine-genocide they organized in 1932–3 and provided no aid for the people. Some news of the famine reached the West and evoked responses from Ukrainians in Western Ukraine and in the diaspora. Massive demonstrations were staged. To draw public attention to the famine, Mykola Lemyk, a member of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, assassinated A. Mailov, the Soviet consul in Lviv, in October 1933. Relief committees were organized in Europe and North America. Memoranda were sent to the League of Nations, and the issue was raised in the British parliament. Cardinal Theodor Innitzer of Vienna headed the relief action. But the Soviet government rejected any proposals of external aid and insisted that the famine was a slanderous fabrication by the enemies of the USSR. The authorities arranged a tour of the USSR by the French statesman E. Herriot, who then denied any reports of famine in Ukraine. Although the foreign press did publish some information on the famine, it did not call forth an adequate public response because at the time the USSR was attempting to establish closer relations with the Western powers (through talks on recognition by the United States and admission to the League of Nations). M. Muggeridge's reports on the famine went unheeded in Great Britain. In addition, there is evidence that foreign governments and correspondents (W. Duranty) avoided discussing or writing about the famine, and sometimes even denied it, for political reasons.

The 1932–3 famine in Ukraine is considered to have been a planned genocide, comparable to the Nazi destruction of the Jews of the Second World War or the starvation of the Cambodian people in 1975 and 1979. There is an extensive list of memoirs and studies on the subject by Ukrainian, Russian, and other writers, and over twenty collections of archival documents about it have been published in Ukraine since the early 1990s. The Soviet regime tried to conceal all traces of the famine-genocide: it also rehabilitated Pavel Postyshev, who was liquidated during the Yezhov terror, and exonerated Joseph Stalin for the policy of forcible collectivization and, hence, for the famine-genocide as well.

During the Second World War the urban population of Ukraine experienced hunger, especially in 1941–2 in eastern Ukraine. The food shortage was due initially to the destruction of supplies by the retreating Soviet Army and to German obstruction of supply deliveries. The occupying Germans then established a regimen that deliberately provided the urban centers of Ukraine with an inadequate supply of food, leading to chronic malnutrition. Rural areas were spared this treatment because the inhabitants there were ‘useful’ insofar as they provided the Nazi Germany with food provisions. In the spring of 1942 Subcarpathian Galicia experienced a partial famine as a result of floods and crop failure. The Ukrainian Central Committee in Cracow organized relief, especially for children.

After the war, in 1946–7, the population in parts of central and eastern Ukraine experienced hunger as a result of postwar dislocations in agriculture and drought. In spite of this, the Soviet government refused to lower delivery quotas on grain and other products. Moreover, the Soviet authorities pushed hard for the delivery of foodstuffs and threatened local officials with charges of hoarding or sabotage if they failed to meet their quotas. As a result, famine conditions emerged. The same did not occur in Western Ukraine, where the collective-farm system had not yet been introduced and the armed resistance of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army rendered food procurement from the region difficult. Many peasants from the eastern oblasts set off to ‘go begging for bread’ in Western Ukraine—in the summer of 1946 trains from the central and eastern Ukraine were crammed with starving people. The authorities tried to stop the westward movement by police methods (western Ukrainian peasants were forbidden to sell food to newcomers) and by rumours of epidemics and poisoned food in the western oblasts. A substantial amount of the foodstuffs requisitioned by the Soviet authorities was exported to areas of Eastern Europe that had fallen into the USSR’s sphere of influence, including Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria. The presence of famine in Ukraine in this period was not acknowledged by the Soviet regime. Estimates of the number of people who died in the 1946–7 famine vary widely, ranging from 100,000 to upwards of one million.

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Andrii Makuch, Vasyl Markus

[This article originally appeared in the Encyclopedia of Ukraine, vol. 1 (1984). The bibliography has been updated.]