Normalization (normalizatsiia). A 1935 agreement between the Ukrainian National Democratic Alliance (UNDO) and the Polish government, designed as a rapprochement between Ukrainians and the Sanacja regime. The term is said to have been coined by Ostap Lutsky. Normalization came about as a result of growing Ukrainian anxieties about the deterioration of international relations (anti-Ukrainian repression in the Soviet Union, the growing affinity between Poland and Germany), the weakening of UNDO's political position as a result of the Pacification in 1930 and new electoral ordinances threatening the Ukrainians with fewer seats in the Polish parliament, growing dissatisfaction from the nationalist wing of UNDO and the secession of Dmytro Paliiv's Front of National Unity group, and an increase in dealings with the Polish government. Discussions were held in July 1935 in Lviv between UNDO leaders and the minister of internal affairs, M. Zyndram-Kościałkowski. An electoral compromise reached at that time guaranteed the Ukrainians 14 seats in the Sejm and five in the Senate, the position of vice-marshal in both chambers, and the elimination of Russophile representation. The government made a proposal for an amnesty, which some activists of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists took advantage of; it also extended credit to several Ukrainian economic organizations in Galicia and made assurances to the Ukrainians for the maintenance of the status quo in schooling. In return the UNDO delegates in the Sejm supported government proposals for ‘state necessities’ (the budget, military matters, and the like). Normalization did not encompass Ukrainian territories north of the Sokal border, which omission sparked Dmytro Levytsky's protest and resignation as UNDO leader. The new leader and spokesman for normalization policies became Vasyl Mudry, who was also vice-marshal of the Sejm.
The UNDO began to press the government for more substantial changes—the introduction of cultural autonomy for eastern Galicia, concessions in elementary and secondary schooling, a Ukrainian university, territorial self-government, an end to colonization, the introduction of the term ‘Ukrainian’ into the official language, access to administrative postings for Ukrainians, the regulation of rivers, and measures against starvation in the mountain regions. The government, apart from satisfying a few minor demands, ignored the overtures. The only positive effects were arrangements for material goods to be supplied to invalids of the former Ukrainian army, an increase in the enrollment of Ukrainian students at university, equal status for the terms ‘Ukrainian’ and ‘Ruthenian’ in bureaucratic usage, bilingual signs on public service buildings in eastern Galicia, and the acceptance of Ukrainian representatives into government committees. Demands for the elimination of bilingualism in schools, the dismantling of the Bereza Kartuzka concentration camp, higher numbers of Ukrainian teachers in the Galicia region, and the extending of credits to Ukrainian farmers were rejected.
At the same time that the Sanacja regime was backing away from any substantial measures to meet Ukrainian demands, an increasingly strident posture toward Ukrainians was being adopted by Polish politicians, local state administrative offices, and military circles. The accord lost almost all its credibility and support as a result. The fiasco, meanwhile, had led to a substantial split in the Ukrainian National Democratic Alliance ranks as early as 1936, which included such critics of the policy as Dmytro Levytsky, Volodymyr Kuzmovych, Ivan Kedryn, and Ostap Lutsky (who grouped around the newspaper Dilo).